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“. . . there’s no such thing as a fair trial in a Smith Act case. . . . 
All rules of evidence have to be scrapped or the government  
can’t make a case.”
—Harriet Bouslog, December 14, 1952
In December 1952 Hawai‘i labor lawyer Harriet Bouslog was asked 
by local union leader Jack Hall to explain what was happening with 
the indictment of the “Hawaii Seven” and with the Smith Act trials 
more generally in America. In a village 182 miles from the courtroom 
in Honolulu, surrounded by pineapple fields, she had the audacity to 
exclaim, “There’s no such thing as a fair trial in a Smith Act case. All 
rules of evidence have to be scrapped or the government can’t make 
a case.”1 For this and other statements critical of the government wit-
nesses and prosecutorial conduct, as well as the remoteness of the evi-
dence to the alleged conspiracy, the Bar Association of Hawaii investi-
gated and suspended Bouslog. Indeed, the organization amended its 
own rules to do so—and her suspension was upheld by the Territorial 
Supreme Court. She lost at the Ninth Circuit Court 4-3, but eventually 
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won at the U.S. Supreme Court. Today her case is remembered not 
only for preserving the independence of the bar, but also for critically 
forwarding the proposition that lawyers have First Amendment rights. 
More generally, her case is one of the many important decisions that 
flow from the original Smith Act case, United States v. Dennis et al, which 
resulted in a 1951 Supreme Court decision that significantly altered 
the “clear and present danger” test of free speech and paved the way 
for fifteen additional trials. This article situates Bouslog’s career and 
her case within this larger story and concludes with an argument that 
her case has been underappreciated in legal history and in the extant 
scholarship on the Smith Act trials. 
Harriet Anna Williams was born in Florida on October 21, 1912, of 
strong middle American and progressive lineage: her parents, Charles 
and Ada Williams, were community-oriented, both teachers from 
agrarian backgrounds and members of the Republican Party.2 Their 
values included decency, fairness, and an enduring commitment to 
the ideal of democracy; they also placed great emphasis on hard work 
and education. Bouslog grew up in Indiana and came of age during 
the Depression; her future political leanings were stirred by her inter-
est in the Spanish Civil War, a cause that her literary heroes, such 
as Ernest Hemingway, avidly supported. Bouslog attended Indiana 
University and in 1932 switched her major from literature to law; in 
so doing she became the only woman in her 1936 graduating class. 
One of her mentors was Fowler Harper, a civil libertarian forced to 
leave the university for advocating the free speech rights of commu-
nists.3 While she was clearly ambitious in forging ahead in law, she 
also married Charles Bouslog the same day she graduated and moved 
to Boston so her husband could complete his doctorate in English at 
Harvard. It was his career that took them both to Hawai‘i, and in 1939 
they traveled to O‘ahu together so he could take up a position at the 
University of Hawai‘i. 
A locally produced documentary on Bouslog’s life elaborates sim-
ply on the reasons for her political engagement in Hawai‘i: “. . . she 
arrived with a dream of paradise and found a feudal society.”4 At that 
time, Hawai‘i was not the tourist paradise of today, but rather a planta-
tion society deeply divided along the class and race lines. The sugar 
and pineapple plantations that formed the backbone of the agrarian 
economy were controlled by oligopolistic enterprises known as the 
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“Big Five”—with interlocking boards of directors whose influence on 
local politics and society was substantial and oriented to their mutual 
corporate self-interest.5 Workers were hired from immigrant labor 
pools, lived in company-controlled housing, with low-wage policies 
and segregation designed to keep ethnic groups apart. Bouslog was a 
keen observer of the human condition, and what she saw in Hawai‘i 
effectively transformed her from a “parlor liberal” to a radical. She 
could not practice law immediately, so she sought secretarial work 
in a business-oriented law firm. She was licensed to practice law just 
16 days after the attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. As 
a result, the territory was immediately subject to martial law—which 
translated into no access to the Bill of Rights or procedural safeguards 
such as habeas corpus. 
Nevertheless, Bouslog picked up stakes and managed to secure a 
position as a staff lawyer at the National War Labor Board in Wash-
ington from 1942 to 1944.6 In the spring of 1944 she was hired to 
replace Harry Bridges as lobbyist for the International Longshore-
men’s and Warehousemen’s Union (ILWU) and the Committee for 
Maritime Unity—unfortunately, and likely due to the fact she was a 
junior woman lawyer, she was the lowest paid registered lobbyist in 
Washington at the time.7 Bridges interviewed her himself for the job 
and in the process effectively became her mentor. The ILWU was in 
the process of becoming the most powerful voice for organized labor 
in the Territory of Hawai‘i, where both dock and plantation work-
ers were organized under the charismatic leadership of Jack Hall. In 
the late 1940s, the ILWU staged two major work stoppages, first in 
1946 on the sugar plantations and then in 1949 on the docks. The 
1946 “Sugar Strike” was the first multi-ethnic and “racially unified” 
strike effort—it was a hallmark of ILWU organizing to bring together 
the many ethnic minorities of the Islands in integrated bargaining 
units in order to counter the “divide and conquer” strategies of the 
Big Five.
In October 1946 Bouslog was requested by Hall and Bridges to 
defend more than four hundred strikers charged with a variety of 
criminal offenses, ranging from serious felony charges to unlawful 
assembly and misdemeanors, even though the acts were minor picket-
line incidents.8 Bridges judged Bouslog as smart, trustworthy, and 
incapable of selling out. Most importantly, she could already practice 
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law in Hawai‘i. With trademark brashness Bridges promised the strik-
ers that no one would go to jail, so expectations of Bouslog were high. 
She delivered.
Soon she joined Myer Symonds, a National Lawyers Guild found-
ing member, and formed the practice of Bouslog and Symonds.9 The 
ILWU became a prominent client, and Jack Hall’s spouse Yoshiko 
worked as their office administrator.10 But by the late 1940s the 
ILWU was repeatedly associated with communism—because of the 
political sympathies nationally of Bridges and locally of Hall. It was 
also in the interests of the Big Five, given the strength of union orga-
nization and popular support, to paint their adversaries as dangerous 
communists.
Meanwhile, a local Red Scare implicated the ILWU directly in 1947 
due to an inflammatory pamphlet authored and published the same 
year by former communist Ichiro Izuka titled The Truth About Commu­
nism in Hawaii (1947).11 Izuka was typical of the former-communist-
turned-informant and, encouraged by territorial and Big Five patrons, 
was all too willing to name names. First targeted were progressive 
teachers and ILWU supporters John and Aiko Reinecke, immediately 
suspended on November 25, 1947, for being members of the “secret, 
underground organization . . . calling itself the Communist Party” and 
not holding the “ideals of democracy,” pending a hearing before the 
Territorial Department of Commissioners of Public Education.12 In 
that hearing, Bouslog represented Aiko, and Myer Symonds, together 
with mainland and longtime ILWU defender Richard Gladstein, rep-
resented John. The hearing was in many respects a “dress rehearsal” 
for the first Smith Act trial in 1949 of the national leadership of the 
Communist Party of the United States of America (CPUSA), complete 
with the testimony of “star witness” Louis Budenz and his portrayal of 
the Party as secretive, conspiratorial, and dangerous. Bouslog was tire-
less in her efforts to defend her client; she sent letters to all lawyers 
in Hawai‘i and asked the ACLU to work on the case. Foreshadowing 
their later actions on the mainland, the organization declined to work 
for alleged communists. In response, Harriet Bouslog was instrumen-
tal in organizing the Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee (HCLC) to sup-
port the Reineckes both financially and morally.13 Unfortunately, and 
despite the best efforts of the legal team, and although no evidence 
was adduced at trial as to any influence of their political convictions 
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on their delivery of curriculum, John Reinecke lost both his teaching 
certificate and his contract. Aiko Reinecke only lost her contract, but 
was unable to find work.
Amidst the growing communist paranoia, the House Committee 
on Un-American Activities (HUAC) came to Hawai‘i in 1950 for a 
series of hearings, an effort viewed by the local left as yet one more 
of Governor Ingram M. Stainback’s tactics to undermine the ILWU. 
Thirty-nine individuals refused to testify, asserting Fifth Amendment 
protection. Bouslog advised her clients not to answer on constitu-
tional grounds and was headstrong in her attack on HUAC, calling 
the hearings a forum for American fascism, a censor, an arbiter of 
political thought, purposefully engineered to sow “terror and fear.” 
The “Reluctant 39,” as they came to be known, were eventually acquit-
ted in court.14
Following the US Supreme Court decision upholding the 1949 
trial verdict and appeal against Eugene Dennis and the leadership 
of the CPUSA, the FBI and the Department of Justice worked closely 
in a series of arrests and follow-on trials from Puerto Rico to Hawai‘i, 
dubbed by the defendants the “second string” and even “third string” 
Smith Act trials.15 As with the first case, they were charged with con-
spiracy to teach and advocate the overthrow of the U.S. government 
by force and violence. In August 1951 the members of the group soon 
to be known as the “Hawaii Seven” were arrested: ILWU leader Jack 
Hall, now-disgraced teacher John Reinecke, Charles and Eileen Fuji-
moto, Dwight Freeman, Jack Kimoto, and newspaper publisher Koji 
Ariyoshi. Again Richard Gladstein was pressed into service—having 
escaped a disbarment effort by the State of California following his 
imprisonment and contempt conviction, a punishment meted out 
by New York judge Harold R. Medina to all defense counsel in the 
original 1949 trial. Also involved were A.L. Wirin, who agreed to act 
privately and not as a member of his organization, the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ALCU) of Southern California, Myer Symonds, and 
Harriet Bouslog.16 Despite her local success and growing reputation 
as a tough and well-prepared attorney, Bouslog was relegated to a rela-
tively junior role. The entire legal team, despite its concerted and 
collective efforts in filing briefs both individually and severally for its 
clients and its strategy in approaching the cases as litigators and not 
ideologues, was doomed.17 
108   the hawaiian journal of history
Whereas other lawyers, perhaps even sympathetic to the trampling 
of the rights of the accused on civil liberties grounds, might have dis-
tanced themselves from politically unpopular clients, Bouslog did the 
complete opposite. She delivered a speech, reprinted in pamphlet 
form under the title Fear, to the Labor Day rally held by the ILWU just 
after the arrest of the Seven. She likened the prosecution of Jack Hall 
to that of Harry Bridges, as part of a larger concerted effort to “. . .
silence all who dare to challenge the right of government to freeze 
wages, while profits soar . . .”18 She then turned her attention to the 
Smith Act trials:
How does the government . . . prove its point? Here is where the stool-
pigeon, the professional witness, the political opportunist, the ren-
egade . . . come in. They announce that they were once Communists, 
and that when they were Communists, they were terrible people who 
engaged in all sorts of illegal activity, but now they have seen the light, 
they would like to help the government put behind bars all their for-
mer associates whom they now hate. They are paid with publicity, with 
witness fees, with royalties from their books and pamphlets.19
Fear was reprinted and distributed in pamphlet form. Perhaps Bouslog 
was emboldened by the reception she received: in the fourteen months 
between the arrests and the trial of the Seven, IMUA responded with 
its own literary efforts: The Answer to “Fear” and a special edition of its 
newsletter Spotlight titled “The American Way of Life.”20
Indeed, when asked by Jack Hall to explain the Smith Act trials to 
union members, she delivered a rousing speech early on a Sunday 
morning on December 14, 1952, in a pineapple field near Honoka‘a 
on Hawai‘i Island. This time she went even farther, taking on court 
process and judicial procedure. She told the workers she wanted to 
tell them some “rather shocking and horrible things that go on at the 
trial.”21 Uttering fateful words that would soon be used against her, 
she exclaimed: “. . . there is no such thing as a fair trial in a Smith Act 
case. . . . All the rules of evidence have to be scrapped or the govern-
ment can’t make a case.”22 Bouslog went further, stating “. . . they just 
make up the rules as they go along” and provided examples from the 
trial where hearsay rules were not applied, and criticized the judge 
for permitting a witness to “tell what was said when [one of the crimi-
nal defendant[s]] was five years old.”23 Regarding the testimony of 
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an informer witness named Johnson, she echoed the civil libertarian 
critique that the Smith Act trials put books and ideas on trial:
[He] came back from [S]an [F]rancisco with communist books in a 
 duffel bag. He said when he got to Honolulu he told Jack Hall the 
names of some of the books. Then the government for two days read 
from books supposed to have been in the duffel bag…on cross-exam-
ination Johnson said he did not tell the names of the books, but just 
showed Jack Hall the duffel bag. So Jack Hall violated the Smith Act 
because he saw a duffel bag with some books on overthrowing the gov-
ernment in it. It’s silly. Why does the government use your money and 
mine to put people in jail for thoughts. . . . Unless we stop the Smith 
trial in its tracks here there will be a new crime. People will be charged 
with knowing what was included in books—ideas. There’ll come a time 
when the only thing to do is to keep your children from learning to 
read.24
Indeed, she suggested that Jack Hall was on trial for reading The Com­
munist Manifesto. She attacked the FBI’s methods, the remoteness of 
the evidence, and the use of conspiracy law: “Conspiracy means to 
charge of lot of people for agreeing to do something you have never 
done.”25
Bouslog’s remarks did not escape the attention of the press. She 
spoke with no prepared text and the only record of what she said 
came from notes taken by an unfriendly reporter.26 She clearly had a 
point: the years of propaganda, national hysteria and increasing fri-
gidity of relations between the US and the USSR in a “Cold War”—
combined with a legal assault on multiple fronts via Taft-Hartley, the 
Smith Act and the McCarran Act—had rendered the mere mention of 
the word “communism” a deeply pejorative label impossible for jurors 
to easily dismiss or even fairly assess, an ostensibly palpable threat to 
national security.
Presiding Judge John Wiig viewed her remarks as also directed at 
the conduct of the prosecution and, once the trial was over, ordered 
further investigation. In 1955, on his request, the Territorial Bar Asso-
ciation filed a complaint in the Territorial Supreme Court, which on 
April 6, 1956, ruled against her.27 At the time, only an aggrieved per-
son could complain to the Association and file a charge of unprofes-
sional conduct, yet the Association amended its own rules, resulting in 
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a suspension order on the basis that she “. . . impugned the integrity 
of the judge presiding” and caused “. . . disrespect for the courts of 
justice and judicial officers generally.”28 The net effect would have 
been that Bouslog would be suspended from the practice of law for 
a year, a result that effectively equaled disbarment as she would have 
to retake the bar exam and then satisfy the territorial bar—who were 
her prosecutors—as to her “good moral character.” Her colleagues 
encouraged her to lie low, apologize, and seek to regain bar admis-
sion with appropriate contrition. She pointedly refused and insisted 
on the zero-sum strategy of taking her accusers to court. Fortunately, 
Judge William Denman ruled that she could practice law pending 
her appeal. 
Myer Symonds and California lawyers A.L. Wirin and John McTer-
nan appealed her case to the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals. Unfor-
tunately, she lost at the Ninth Circuit, and she was roundly chas-
tised for lack of humility, for not showing any “genuine remorse” or 
“some appreciation of her error.” Still, Judge Walter Pope’s dissent 
was important and timely, warning that the appellate decision served 
notice for lawyers to hold their tongues, as criticism of courtroom 
procedure could be grounds for disbarment:
Suspending one person like Harriet Bouslog Sawyer from the practice 
for one year is not merely the imposition of punishment on her. In 
upholding this judgment this court serves notice on all lawyers every-
where to hold their tongues, to watch their speech lest some court hold 
criticism of government prosecutions no matter what abuses may exist. 
That is why this freedom is of the very essence of liberty.29
Again Bouslog made plans to appeal and even Harry Bridges tried 
his best to talk her out of it. After all, by this time McCarthyism was on 
the wane, and the Hawaii Seven convictions had already been over-
turned. Stubborn and convinced of the legal importance of her case, 
she insisted on going all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court. On June 
29, 1959, a majority of the Court found in her favor, noting that a 
lawyer’s criticism of rules of evidence does not constitute an improper 
attack on a judge, pointing out that appellate courts find fault with 
procedures all the time—that is entirely within their role. Her case, 
In re Sawyer, effectively stands for the proposition that attorneys in 
the U.S. are allowed to criticize the courts regardless of their involve-
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ment in the case at hand, so long as no obstruction of justice occurs. 
When one sees an attorney in a televised media scrum standing on 
courtroom steps criticizing trial procedure, it is partially due to the 
early efforts of Harriet Bouslog. Justice William Brennan, writing for 
the Court, stated:
We start with the proposition that lawyers are free to criticize the state 
of the law. Many lawyers say that the rules of evidence relative to the 
admission of statements by those alleged to be co-conspirators are 
overbroad or otherwise unfair and unwise . . . and that a Smith Act trial 
is apt to become a trial of ideas. Others disagree. But all are free to 
express their views on these matters, and no one would say that this sort 
of criticism constituted an improper attack on the judges who enforced 
such rules and who presided at the trials. . . . Such criticism simply can-
not be equated with an attack on the motivation or the integrity or the 
competence of the judges. And surely permissible criticism may as well 
be made to a lay audience as to a profession; oftentimes the law is modi-
fied through popular criticism.30 
Brennan went further, and used the opportunity to criticize the gov-
ernment’s growing habit of using conspiracy charges rather than overt 
acts, especially when a number of defendants were being charged 
together, as a “serious threat to the administration of justice.”31
Still the judgment was hardly unanimous. Justice Felix Frankfurter 
was direct in his dissent, holding lawyers to a higher standard, while 
paradoxically suggesting their rights to constitutional expression: “Of 
course, a lawyer is a person and he too has a constitutional freedom of 
utterance and may exercise it to castigate courts and their administra-
tion of justice. But a lawyer actively participating in a trial, particularly 
an emotionally charged criminal prosecution, is not merely a lawyer.”32 
His conclusion was a more blistering attack:
Certainly courts are not, and cannot be, immune from criticism, and 
lawyers, of course, may indulge in criticism. . . . But when a lawyer goes 
before a public gathering and fiercely charges that the trial in which 
he is a participant is unfair, that the judge lacks integrity, the circum-
stances under which he speaks not only sharpen what he says but he 
imparts to his attack inflaming and warping significance. He says that 
the very court-room into which he walks to plead his case is a travesty, 
that the procedures and reviews established to protect his client from 
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such conduct are a sham…. Certainly this Court, the supreme tribunal 
charged with maintaining the rule of law, should be the last place in 
which these attacks on the fairness and integrity of a judge and the 
conduct of a fair trial should find constitutional sanction.33
Nevertheless Brennan’s 5-4 plurality decision carried the day; in his 
words, it was permissible for lawyers to “. . . litigate by day and casti-
gate by night.”
Yet Bouslog’s victory in In Re Sawyer has not been granted the his-
torical and legal recognition it deserves. Margaret Tarkington, in a 
recent complete and detailed overview of the law governing attorney 
speech, noted that Justice Brennan did not deal with the full range 
of constitutional issues at stake, because his ruling did allow for dis-
cipline on arguments based on the obstruction of justice.34 Tarking-
ton effectively relegates Sawyer to being one step on the way to the 
Court’s landmark decisions in Sullivan and Garrison five years later, in 
which the First Amendment was interpreted to prohibit punishment 
for all speech regarding government officials unless the tests elabo-
rated in those cases were met.35 Tarkington also noted that Brennan’s 
discussion was also taken out of context to mean that both attorneys 
in pending cases as well as those not involved might be prohibited 
from speech, rather than Brennan’s obvious point that even attorneys 
involved in cases should be allowed to speech without discipline.36 That 
analysis, however, does not appreciate the overall historical context in 
which the decision was made.
Bouslog’s courage and determination in In Re Sawyer is significant 
in the context of the legal chill of the early to mid 1950s. After all, 
Judge Harold R. Medina sentenced all five of the lawyers in the 1949 
Dennis case for contempt. Lead attorney Harry Sacher eventually 
took his case all the way to the Supreme Court—he lost, but the case 
did lead to a broader legal discussion as to whether or not a sitting 
judge should avail himself of a summary procedure for post-trial con-
tempt, especially if the case involved personal attacks on the judge.37 
A second case involving Sacher came to the Supreme Court in 1954. 
After serving his six-month prison term—the longest of any of the 
attorneys in the 1949 trial—Sacher was then permanently disbarred by 
the Bar Association of the City of New York. Eventually he successfully 
challenged his disbarment in Sacher v. Association of the Bar of the City 
harriet bouslog   113
of New York.38 Given that the decision of the Territorial Bar Associa-
tion to suspend her membership occurred on April 16, 1956, Bous-
log’s decision to appeal to the Ninth Circuit would have occurred 
after the Sacher’s successful challenge to his disbarment and after the 
California communists found guilty in Yates were granted certiorari 
on October 17, 1955. Her case also occurred before oral arguments 
were heard by the Supreme Court on October 8 and 9, 1956, and 
“Red Monday”—June 17, 1957—the day four cases were decided by 
the Supreme Court in favor of left-wing defendants, including Yates. 
Bouslog would have been absolutely aware of these cases and the risks 
involved, via her membership in the National Lawyers Guild and her 
efforts spearheading the creation of the Hawaii Civil Liberties Com-
mittee. After all, two of her attorneys on the case, John T. McTernan 
and A.L. Wirin, had also been involved in the case of the “California 
Reds” in Yates. They certainly knew of the potential for the Supreme 
Court re-hearing of a Smith Act case in terms of the follow-on impact 
for other Smith Act defendants, but would have also known that, even 
with a changed composition of the Court since the original 1951 deci-
sion in Dennis, a victory was far from certain.
Moreover, the legal chill following the contempt citations, and the 
wider impact of McCarthyism generally, had disastrous consequences 
for those seeking adequate legal representation, something Bouslog 
also would have known. In preparation for the “second string” New 
York Smith Act trial, lead defendant and party stalwart Elizabeth Gur-
ley Flynn reportedly approached and was turned down by more than 
200 lawyers in an effort to find representation.39 Some defendants 
were forced to represent themselves, as was Steve Nelson in his state-
level sedition case in Pennsylvania in 1951–1952. Fortunately, and 
largely because of the financial support provided in the Territory by 
the ILWU as well as the genuinely popular support for Hawaii Seven 
defendants, firms such as Bouslog and Symonds could withstand the 
legal chill. However, on the mainland, only in the Philadelphia Smith 
Act trial did eminent local defense attorneys not connected to the 
National Lawyers Guild, union clientele, civil libertarian, or left-wing 
causes band together to construct a formidable legal team, and even 
they lost at trial, despite the fact that the verdict was handed down the 
same week Joseph McCarthy was censured by the Senate in 1954.40 
Not only does Bouslog’s case get relegated to minor status in legal 
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history, it is also sidelined by the scholarship on the Smith Act tri-
als and the history of the McCarthy era. All three books written on 
the original 1949 trial discuss the impact in terms of generating the 
follow-on trials around the United States and the critical role of Yates 
in ending the prosecutions, as well the contempt citations against the 
1949 lawyers, but none mention the unique victory of Harriet Bous-
log in Hawai‘i.41 To be fair, all three books focus almost exclusively on 
the 1949 trial; there currently exists no text that fully discusses all the 
Smith Act trials or all the related prosecutions such as both of Sach-
er’s cases, the disbarment case against 1949 lawyer Abraham J. Isser-
man, or defendant and post-1951 fugitive Gil Green’s challenge to 
his contempt conviction based on his failure to surrender himself to 
serve his sentence.42 Arthur J. Sabin’s book, In Calmer Times, examin-
ing all the “Red Monday” cases does scrutinize the history of Supreme 
Court jurisprudence from the Dennis decision in 1951 through to 
Yates, but it too omits any discussion of Harriet Bouslog’s remarkable 
victory.43 More tellingly, despite the fact that T. Michael Holmes inter-
viewed Harriet Bouslog for his study of communism in Hawai‘i and 
mentions her work on behalf of the “Reluctant 39,” the Reineckes, 
and the Hawai‘i Seven, he too makes no mention of her suspension or 
her court case.44 Gerald Horne’s text Fighting in Paradise: Labor Unions, 
Racism, Communists and the Making of Modern Hawai‘i devotes an entire 
chapter to the Hawai‘i Seven trial, yet the only attention he devotes to 
Bouslog involves her “clashing” with ILWU leader Jack Hall and the 
sexist jokes of Myer Symonds that Bouslog did not appreciate.45 In 
short, gendered gossip takes precedence over legal import.
Finally, the paucity of attention paid to Bouslog’s case is likely 
related to the short shrift generally granted to the Smith Act trials 
in the larger literature on free speech. Furthermore, this tendency 
seems to be getting worse, not better. Christopher Finan’s account, 
From the Palmer Raids to the Patriot Act: A History of the Fight For Free Speech 
in America, pays scant notice to the original 1949 trial and makes no 
mention of the 15 subsequent trials or related challenges.46 Much 
better is Geoffrey Stone’s prize-winning Perilous Times: Free Speech in 
Wartime: From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Terrorism, which dis-
cusses the original passage of the Smith Act in 1940, the case of the 29 
Trotskyists (members of the Socialist Workers Party) in Minneapolis, 
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and devotes 16 pages to the Dennis trial verdict and appellate and 
Supreme Court decisions. Yet Stone then predictably jumps to Yates 
and the membership cases.47 Again, Bouslog’s successful challenge is 
omitted, even though her case bears directly on freedom of speech.
Bouslog’s determination and eventual success was all the more 
remarkable given her status as a female labor lawyer—often perceived 
as junior or subject to verbal harassment by her male counterparts 
and the press. Yet Bouslog purposefully played with gender stereo-
types throughout her career. She refused to don conservative cloth-
ing and conform to professional expectations—often wearing a trade-
mark scarf or flower in her hair in court, bright red lipstick, dresses 
that hugged her figure, and no uncomfortable girdle to flatten her 
natural curves. IMUA Spotlight commentator, Tony Todaro, called 
her the “Proletarian Pin-up” during the Hawai‘i Seven trial. Over 
the years, Bouslog honed her dynamic courtroom presence. She was 
deliberate in not hiding her sensuality and sexuality to achieve success 
and hoodwink those who underestimated her. She liked to make a 
grand entrance, strolling into courtrooms with great confidence. This 
strategy was successful, however, because she was always incredibly 
well prepared, her briefs written and finely reasoned with attention 
to legal detail and precedent, guided by both compassion and clarity. 
Legal scholar Mari Matsuda, who knew Bouslog personally and 
wrote a biographical chapter on her in an edited collection on early 
women lawyers in Hawai‘i, aptly described her physical and rhetorical 
style: 
She dressed like Bacall and fought like Bogart. She talked like Locke 
and Jefferson, but she could make them sound like Lenin. She called 
plantation workers “my people” but she enjoyed the trappings of the 
good life. She grew up in middle America but she preferred the drama 
of the middle Pacific. She decried the treatment of women in a man’s 
world, but she was comfortable exploiting stereotypical female imag-
ery. Old-time Honolulu lawyers never fail to mention Bouslog’s tight 
skirts. It was rumored, one said, that she didn’t always wear undergar-
ments. This claim may say more about the sophomoric obsessions of 
the male bar than it does about Bouslog’s attire. It is clear, nonetheless, 
that Harriet Bouslog was certainly a provocative woman, self-designed 
and widely known as such.48
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Bouslog’s last law partner before she retired, Mark Bernstein, 
described her as a “champagne socialist,” noting that she always kept 
bubbly chilling in the refrigerator at her office.49 Her appearance and 
radical politics belied her hard-nosed business instincts: she invested 
in Honolulu real estate and furtively bought the building from her 
landlord on Merchant Street rather than be evicted. She and second 
husband, Steven Sawyer, ostentatiously drove fine automobiles. “Phil-
osophically, I’m a radical . . . but I live in a capitalistic system and I 
make money from it,” she once told a local reporter, adding, “I like 
the sybaritic life. You might describe me as a peasant with a taste for 
the luxurious.”50
Bouslog’s achievements cannot be overestimated. Hers was one 
of the very few Smith Act-related court cases to be resolved in her 
favor. In 1978, decades after the Reineckes lost their occupations and 
reputations due to the Red Scare, she was also successful in pushing 
for a formal apology from the state and a significant compensation 
package—perhaps the only financial restitution package for victims 
of McCarthyism at the state level.51 Her persistence eventually paid 
off in many other ways: due to legal challenges she was involved in, 
juries more closely reflected Hawai‘i’s population. As well, her efforts 
led to modification of the territory’s unlawful riot and assembly act 
and to the conspiracy statute, making strikers less vulnerable to crimi-
nal charges.52 She also campaigned tirelessly for the abolition of the 
death penalty, particularly following her intervention in the case of 
John Palakiko and James Majors, two underprivileged young men 
sentenced to death for the murder of a white woman.53 Overall, she 
did her utmost to change the existing power structure of Hawai‘i and 
never shied away from a case because a client or a cause could not 
pay, and thus her practice included prostitutes, indigenous groups, 
and petty criminals.54 She received numerous honors in recognition 
of her long service, including lifetime membership in ILWU Local 
142, the Alan Saunders Civil Liberties Award, and the Hawai‘i Women 
Lawyers Distinguished Service Award. Finally, a scholarship was cre-
ated in her honor for children of members of the ILWU. In the words 
of Mark Bernstein, who delivered the eulogy at her funeral in 1998, 
she was the “real deal… flamboyant and provocative, and ahead of 
her time in every way. . . .”55
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O‘ahu, Mark D. Bernstein, Harriet Bouslog’s law partner before she retired, and 
Matthew Poggi and Bahar Banei for their research assistance and support.
 1  In re Sawyer 360 U.S. 622 (1959) at 644.
 2  Mari J. Matsuda, “Harriet Bouslog” in Called from Within: Early Women Lawyers of 
Hawai‘i, ed. Mari J. Matsuda (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1992), 149.
 3  Matsuda, “Harriet Bouslog,” 151.
 4  Biography Hawaii: Harriet Bouslog. Directed by Joy Chong-Stannard. (PBS Hawaii 
and the Center for Biographical Research, University of Hawai‘i-Manoa, 2003), 
DVD.
 5  The “Big Five” were Castle & Cooke, American Factors, C. Brewer, Alexander & 
Baldwin, and Theo H. Davies.
 6  Barbara Nutter, “Harriet Bouslog: defender of the ‘underdog,’” HA, July 22, 
1970.
 7  Nutter, July 22, 1970.
 8  Nutter, July 22, 1970 and Mary Adamski, “Attorney fought for underdogs,” HSB, 
September 15, 1999.
 9  Symonds met Bouslog while the two worked together during the 1946 Sugar 
Strike defending the ILWU; Symonds had been a lawyer with the West Coast 
firm of Gladstein, Anderson, Resner, and Sawyer, which represented the union 
on the mainland. See T. Michael Holmes, The Specter of Communism in Hawaii 
(Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1994), 47.
10  Mark D. Bernstein, Personal conversation. March 20, 2013.
11  Ichiro Izuka. The Truth About Communism in Hawaii, (Honolulu: N.P., 1947). 
Available in Harriet Bouslog Biography File, Center for Labor Education and 
Research (CLEAR), University of Hawai‘i at West O‘ahu.
12  The complete list of charges was published in the HA. See Holmes The Specter, 
especially chapter 3, “The Stainback Rebellion,” 43–52 and chapter 7, “The 
Ideals of Democracy,” 75–88; chapter 8, “In Their Defense,” 89–97; chapter 
9, “I neither Deny nor Affirm,” 99–113; and chapter 10, “Teachers No More,” 
114–122.
13  The organization faced significant and well-organized opposition. On June 
14, 1949, the Hawaii Residents’ Association, known by the Hawaiian acronym 
IMUA, was formed to address “the creeping paralysis of Communism in Hawaii” 
and on June 25, 1949 the Conference of Civic Associations formed “to com-
bat attacks of Communist agents against civic organizations”—both were vocal 
against the 1949 ILWU strike and eventually the Hawaii 7 trial. IMUA was well 
known for its anti-Communist broadsheet Spotlight and weekly radio broadcasts.
14  Holmes, The Specter, 159.
15  Katherine A.S. Sibley, The Cold War (Westport, Conn. and London, UK: Green-
wood Press, 1998), 40; Michal R. Belknap, Cold War Political Justice: The Smith 
118   the hawaiian journal of history
Act, the Communist Party, and American Civil Liberties (Westport, Conn. and Lon-
don, UK: Greenwood Press, 1977), 156–157; Simon W. Gerson, Record of Smith 
Act Cases. (New York: Joint Self Defense Committee, 1956). Available in Box 7, 
Gil Green FBI Files, Tamiment Library, New York University.
16  Wirin also acted as chief counsel in the California Smith Act trial. See Peter 
L. Steinberg, The Great “Red Menace”: United States Persecution of American Commu­
nists 1947–1952 (Westport, Conn. and London, UK: Greenwood Press, 1984), 
235. The ACLU famously purged its organization of communists in 1940, 
including national board member Elizabeth Gurley Flynn. See Samuel Walker, 
In Defense of American Liberties: A History of the ACLU. Second edition. (Carbon-
dale and Edwardsville, Ill.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1990), 127.
17  Although all of Hawaii 7 defendants were convicted at trial—as with the vast 
majority of Smith Act defendants—the decision was reversed following the Yates 
decision. See Fujimoto v. United States, 252 F. 2d 342 (9th Cir., 1958) and Yates v. 
United States 354 U.S. (1957).
18  Harriet Bouslog, Fear (Honolulu: International Longshoremen’s and Ware-
housemen’s Union, 1951), 4.
19  Fear, 12.
20  Holmes, The Specter, 194.
21  In re Sawyer 360 U.S. 622 (1959) at 641.
22  In re Sawyer 360 U.S. 622 (1959) at 644.
23  In re Sawyer 360 U.S. 622 (1959) at 645.
24  In re Sawyer 360 U.S. 622 (1959) at 645.
25  Quoted in Law Guild Review, 1959, 107.
26  Matsuda, “Harriet Bouslog,” 163.
27  Harold Morse, “Harriet Bouslog Won Landmark Labor Cases,” HSB, 22 April 
1998.
28  In re Sawyer 360 U.S. 622 (1959) at 626.
29  In re Sawyer 260 F2d (9th Cir.,1958). 
30  In re Sawyer 360 U.S. 622 (1959) at 631–632. Significantly, this decision fol-
lowed the Supreme Court’s four decisions released on “Red Monday” in 1957, 
including Yates, an appeal of the California Smith Act trial. The decision, while 
not technically “overturning” the Vinson Court’s 1951 decision, in Dennis v. 
United States 341 U.S. 494 (1951), effectively halted the Smith Act prosecutions. 
See Arthur J. Sabin, In Calmer Times: The Supreme Court and Red Monday (Phila-
delphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 160–172 and Belknap, Cold 
War Political Justice, 236–25.
31  Brennan cited Krulewich v. United States 336 U.S. 440, 453 (1949). My own 
analysis of political trials suggests that the continuous thread that runs through 
most Cold War prosecutions—both East and West—is the use of conspiracy 
charges, allowing the construction of courtroom narratives without having to 
prove overt acts, demonize an “enemy within,” and effectively prescribe the 
limits of permissible dissent. See Barbara J. Falk, Making Sense of Political Trials: 
Causes and Categories (Toronto: Munk Centre for International Studies, 2008).
harriet bouslog   119
32  360 U.S. at 366; emphasis added.
33  In re Sawyer 360 U.S. 622 (1959) at 669.
34  Margaret Tarkington, “The Truth Be Damned: The First Amendment, Attor-
ney Speech, and Judicial Reputation,” in The Georgetown Law Journal 97 (2009): 
1615.
35  The test is that false statements are made with a high degree of awareness of the 
probable falsity, thus protecting the press from making erroneous statements 
given the overriding interest of free and independent media. Sullivan allows for 
fulsome attacks on both government and public officials. See Geoffrey R. Stone, 
Perilous Times: Free Speech in Wartime, From the Sedition Act of 1798 to the War on Ter­
rorism (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 2004), 73, 270; New York Times Co. 
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. (1964); and Garrison v. Louisiana 379 U.S. (1964).
36  Tarkington, “The Truth Be Damned,” 1615.
37  Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, 72 S. Ct. 451, 96 L. Ed. 717. Interestingly, 
Sacher is cited as a ruling authority in US government efforts to uphold the 
contempt citations by Judge Julius Hoffman against maverick defense law-
yer  William Kunstler in the 1969–1970 trial of the Chicago Seven; for more 
infor mation, see http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/Chicago7/
chicago7.html.
38  Sacher v. Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 347 U.S. 388 (1954).
39  Ellen Schrecker, Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1998), 303.
40  Sherman Labovitz, Being Red in Philadelphia, A Memoir of the McCarthy Era (Phila-
delphia: Camino Books, 1998), 135–140.
41  Belknap, Cold War Political Justice ; Steinberg The Great “Red Menace” ; Scott 
Martelle, The Fear Within: Spies, Commies, and American Democracy on Trial (New 
Bruns wick, N.J. and London: Rutgers University Press, 2011).
42  See also In re Isserman, 345 U.S. 286 (1953) and Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 
165 (1957).
43  Sabin, In Calmer Times.
44  Holmes, The Specter.
45  Gerald Horne, Fighting in Paradise: Labor Unions, Racism, and Communists in 
the Making of Modern Hawai‘i (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011), 
243–244. Horne quotes from an interview conducted by Sanford Zalburg with 
 Harriet Bouslog, March 11, 1976. Available at the University of Hawai‘i at 
Mānoa Archives.
46  Christopher M. Finan, From the Palmer Raids to the Patriot Act: A History in the Fight 
for Free Speech in America, (Boston: Beacon Press, 2007), 149–150.
47  Stone, Perilous Times, 255; 395–415. The logic of the Smith Act led to a number 
of cases of CPUSA leaders who had allegedly and knowingly been aware, as 
members, of the Party’s policy to teach and advocate violent overthrow. As a 
Justice Department lawyer once expressed to Anthony Lewis: “It’s not enough 
to be a member of the party, you have be a member.” See Anthony Lewis, Freedom 
for the Thought We Hate: A Biography of the First Amendment (New York: Perseus, 
120   the hawaiian journal of history
2007), 123. In Scales v. United States, 388 U.S. 203 (1961), the conviction of 
North Carolina leader Junius Scales was affirmed, although the membership 
cases were halted after Scales’ sentence was commuted by Kennedy in 1961 
because of the effect of such prosecutions on legitimate expression. See Lewis, 
12–124; Ellen Schrecker, McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents. (Boston 
and New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2002), 1–2. Scales had long ceased being 
a member of the CPUSA even before he began to serve his sentence.
48  Matsuda, “Harriet Bouslog,” 164–165.To support Matsuda’s hunch, in the 
PBS/Biography Hawai‘i documentary on Bouslog’s life, retired Federal District 
Judge Samuel P. King pointedly stated that Harriet Bouslog had “juries mesmer-
ized” and that she “didn’t wear a girdle. . . .” See Chong-Stannard, Biography 
Hawaii: Harriet Bouslog.
49  Bernstein, Personal conversation, March 20, 2013.
50  Quoted in Matsuda, “Harriet Bouslog,” 165.
51  Matsuda, “Harriet Bouslog,” 164. In the 1970s, Bouslog successfully petitioned 
to have the case re-opened. Belatedly John Reinecke’s teaching certificate was 
restored, and he received a formal apology and financial restitution from the 
State of Hawai‘i for his loss of income, pension, and the denial of civil rights. 
For her efforts, Bouslog took no fee from the $250,000 settlement. See Naomi 
Sodetani, “Quiet Courage Under Fire: The Life of Aiko Tokimasa Reinecke, 
1907–1998,” Hawaii Herald: Hawaii’s Japanese American Journal, June 19, 1998.
52  Chong-Stannard, Biography Hawaii: Harriet Bouslog.
53  Both were to be executed on September 13, 1951. Just 15 minutes before the 
execution was scheduled to occur, Bouslog managed to obtain a stay, yet on 
September 19 Governor Oren Long stated he knew of no new evidence and 
set a new date for September 22. 16,000 people signed a petition for clemency. 
At the last minute, Bouslog managed to secure a new trial by producing new 
evidence that they were beaten and compelled to testify against themselves, and 
had no benefit of counsel before interrogation. See Matsuda, “Harriet Bous-
log,” 157–158. Two years later, the Ninth Circuit upheld. More than six years 
later, the United States Supreme Court refused the appeal. Governor Samuel 
Wilder King eventually commuted their death sentences on August 14, 1954, 
three years later capital punishment was eliminated in Hawai‘i. In 1962, Gover-
nor Burns signed parole orders freeing both. See also Harriet Bouslog Memo-
rial Service Program, April 26, 1998: available in Harriet Bouslog Biography 
File, CLEAR and Mark D. Bernstein, Harriet Bouslog Eulogy, April 26, 1998. 
Available in Harriet Bouslog Biography File, CLEAR.
54  Esther K. Arinaga, “Harriet Bouslog: Lawyer, Risk Taker, and Champion of the 
Underdog,” Biography Hawai‘i: Five Lives, A Series of Public Remembrances. Avail-
able in Harriet Bouslog Biography File, CLEAR, no date.
55  Mark D. Bernstein, Harriet Bouslog Eulogy. 
